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FAMILY COURT JURISDICTION
ELOEEN D. OUGHTERSON*
T HE establishment of a new state-wide court of record presents an intriguing
challenge to the bar, not only in the unique experience, thus presented, of
seeing such a court emerge fully developed into being, but also in the op-
portunity to share in its development and identity. The question of jurisdiction
and procedures in the new Family Court is one for attorneys both to pose and to
answer. There is yet no body of case law on this specific court; although
analogies may be drawn from earlier courts and their operative law and inter-
pretative citations, their identity is sufficiently different that new situations
may be easily distinguished.
Basically, the primary resource on jurisdiction must be, and is, the Con-
stitution; the Family Court was created by the amendment rewriting the
Judiciary Article VI approved finally by the electorate on November 7, 1961,
effective September 1, 1962, and its area of service was outlined therein. Of
course, the supreme court retains and has original jurisdiction of all matters,
but other courts were granted concurrent jurisdiction of specialized proceed-
ings. The intent of the revisers was to provide, in problems affecting children,
and familial relationships, a forum specially devised to hear the whole problem
and to act on a continuing basis toward solution and rehabilitation.
.Formerly, the Constitution of 1894, carried over without change in 1921
and 1938, permitted the Legislature to establish Children's Courts or Courts
of Domestic Relations, as separate forums or as parts of other courts, con-
ferring "such jurisdiction as may be necessary for the correction, protection,
guardianship and disposition of delinquent, neglected or dependent minors,
and for the punishment and correction of adults responsible for or contributing
to such delinquency, neglect or dependency, and to compel the support of a
wife, child or poor relative by persons legally chargeable therewith who abandon
or neglect to support any of them."' Under this enabling section, a patchwork
of courts was established throughout the state over the years. They had vary-
ing jurisdiction and powers, civil, criminal and quasi-criminal, and were similar
only in that none were courts of record. Precedents could not easily hold on
a state-wide basis; geography rather than distinguishing facts governed the
procedures and law to be followed.2
*Confidential Law Clerk, Family Court, Erie County; member, New York Bar.
1. N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 18 (1894), prior to amendment.
2. Although the new Family Court is a state-wide court, still a geographical dichotomy
has been established in varying constitutional and legislative provisions differentiating
courts in New York City and outside metropolitan New York. Some of the legislative
enactments have continued the distinguishing of procedures and practices in the two areas
which will mean that a new body of law to be interpreted as to the-identity of the forum
using it will arise. Already judges in upstate areas have found that some of the provisions
in the law, developed to cure abuses in the City of New York, seem to be hampering the
several functions and practices of their courts as they relate to their respective communities.
Continued and dedicated work by the appropriate legislative committees in meeting with
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Those sections of the presently amended Constitution, having reference
to the new Family Court, are necessarily brief although they outline more
specifically the function of the court than the former provisions set forth above.
Certain areas of original jurisdiction are there made mandatory to the court,
while other groups of proceedings could, at the discretion of the Legislature,
be established in its functioning. Most similar to the old law is the primary
area of absolute jurisdiction over juveniles, the Constitution requiring that the
Family Court shall have original jurisdiction of proceedings, to be originated
in the manner provided by law, involving "the protection, treatment, correc-
tion and commitment of those minors who are in need of the exercise of the
authority of the court because of circumstances of neglect, delinquency or
dependency, as the Legislature may determine." 3 Although these terms were
used in both old and new Constitutions, they were not and have not been
defined therein, enabling the Legislature to establish such criteria and cate-
gories for each as it saw fit.4
Another area of mandatory jurisdiction, logically an extension of the
services and specialization of the Family Court, is in the custody of minors,
except as incidental to marital actions or specific proceedings in habeas corpus,
and these may be referred by the supreme court.0 Similarly, exclusive original
jurisdiction of support is in the Family Court under the same limitations as
for custody.6 Since cases in these categories are more likely to be the subject
of multiple hearings and proceedings, and may rest on allegations of changed
circumstances, the facilities of the Family Court are more effective for inde-
pendent investigation and recommendation. Increasing concern with the socio-
logical and legal problems in the field of adoption caused the revisers of the
Constitution to grant exclusive original jurisdiction to the Family Court.7
Creation or abrogation of this specific familial relationship requires the greatest
care in protecting the rights and looking to the welfare of all the parties. Filia-
tion proceedings to establish paternity, long the concern of Children's Courts
and Courts of Domestic Relations by precedent and by legislative enactment,
were constitutionally reserved to the Family Court.8 Proceedings for concilia-
all those courts, agencies and persons charged with the actual implementation of the law,
will result in new and corrective legislation in the current session of the New York State
Legislature which may even be enacted at the time of publication of this Law Review.
3. N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 13(b)(1).
4. The criticism that there is no constitutional authority for creation of the category
"person in need of supervision" does not seem to be valid in view of the delegation to the
Legislature of the determination of specific implementation of this section of the Con-
stitution.
5. N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 13(b) (2) and (c).
6. N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 13(b) (4) and (c).
7. N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 13(b) (3); for this reason many authorities have questioned
the constitutionality of § 641 of the Family Court Act granting concurrent jurisdiction to
the Surrozate's Court. As originally prepared, there was no attempt to grant such parallel
jurisdiction, but it was introduced in the first printing sent to the houses of the Legislature.
See the Draft dated January 30, 1962, and S.I. 3494, S.P. 3789 and A.I. 4909 and A.P.
5203. and successive printings, of the 1962 Legislature.
8. N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 13(b)(5).
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tion of spouses, successful in other states but new to New York, were granted
exclusively to the Family Court.9 This should become one of the most im-
portant and effective functions of the court, but presently there is no basic
acceptance of or effective dedication to its principles in the implementing legisla-
tion and the procedures of the court.
Matters of jurisdiction, permissive in nature, to be established by law,
present the greatest challenge. Conflicts among the several courts involving
cases of these types of jurisdiction rest for interpretation on other grounds
than Constitutional intent. These include "the guardianship of the person of
minors" and "crimes and offenses by or against minors or between spouses or
between parent and child or between members of the same household,"' 0 and
any new classes of actions or proceedings which may be created by the
Legislature." This is the only specific reference in the Constitution to a
criminal jurisdiction in the Family Court; all of the preceding categories of
exclusive jurisdiction have civil connotation. Even in the case of children who
may be delinquent, there is no connection to any criminal action. The decision
of the Legislative Committee to accept and implement this pernissive juris-
diction to the Family Court, but to limit it to civil status and proceedings,
has presented certain serious problems, and has been the basis for most of the
questions raised by courts, police and other functioning agencies.
Around this brief skeletal framework in the Constitution, it was necessary
to develop a large body of law, giving specific implementation to these direc-
tions. The resultant legislation met the challenge of the task, reexamining
current procedures and ideas and creating .many new legal, social and philo-
sophical concepts. While specific provisions of the laws passed at various
times under the old Constitution were used and many sections were wholly
translated,' 2 this was by no means a mere renumbering of the old law.13
The pressure of the time factor in the brief period provided in the effective
date of the constitutional amendment and the legislative session, was such
that there was no real opportunity at that time for study of the proposed
legislation by attorneys and other interested groups on a state-wide basis
9. N.Y. Const. art. VI, J 13(b)(6).
10. N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 13(b)(7).
11. N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 7(c).
12. See the Children's Court Act of the State of 'ew York, being chapter 547 of
the Laws of 1922, as amended generally by Chapter 393 of the Laws of 1930, and variously
thereafter; the Domestic Relations Court Act of the City of New York, being chapter 482
of the Laws of 1933 as amended variously thereafter, which included a so-called Family
Court (§§ 91-159); the New York City Criminal Court Act, being chapter 659 of the
Laws of 1910, as amended generally by chapter 746 of the Laws of 1933 and variously
thereafter, including specifically Article V on paternity proceedings and Appendix creating
the Girls' Term Court, being chapter 716 of the Laws of 1951 and amended I.ariously
thereafter.
13. Other proposals were presented to the 1962 Legislature which were recodifications
to the old law, rather than the fresh approach of the law finally passed. See, for example,
S.1. 719, of the 1962 Legislature.
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before final passage. 14 The Legislative Committee'0 was specifically authorized
to continue to study the law as it became effective and to make recommenda-
tions for changes at the next session of the Legislature.1"
The format of the Family Court Act continues the current trend in the
recodification of the Civil Practice Act and Rules of Civil Practice of includ-
ing adjective procedures insofar as possible in specialized actions and pro-
ceedings in the substantive sections of the law. Since certain areas of Family
Court practice are basic, there is much repetition in the several articles, but
the bar and the Family Court facilities will find a more cohesive resource
in the law. as they meet individual matters. There is a strong and new
emphasis on the due process of law revealed in the legislation, which poses
the inevitable dilemma in trying to fulfill the rehabilitative processes of the
court. The role of the attorney as an officer of the court and representing
the best interests of the client should necessarily be in accord with the court's
purpose of giving aid and assistance to those persons who are in difficulty. Yet
error, misinterpretation, failure of proof, violation of rights may well exist, so
that the obligations of counsel extend to an adversary position not completely
contemplated by the Legislature. The horns of the attorney's dilemma might
be, on one side, the wishes and legal rights of the client, and on the other,
his best interests and real need for help. It may pose for such legal representa-
tive the difficult, perhaps unethical problem of giving up certain rights for his
client's own good, or permitting irreparable social and psychological harm to be
done in the defense of due process.
A set of procedures have been developed in the most sensitive areas of
the Family Court jurisdiction, which attempts to solve this aspect of the
problem. Two hearings have been prescribed in matters of neglect, delinquency
and family offenses: adjudicatory and dispositional.'7 The court must deter-
mine whether it has jurisdiction over the respondent, on the basis of the
allegations in the petition. If it determines that such person is rightfully before
it and that the process of the court has been properly invoked, then the back-
14. The Joint Legislative Committee on Court Reorganization presented its draft
of the Family Court Act on January 30, 1962 and it was introduced to the Senate on
February 22, 1962, S.I. 3494, S.P. 3789, to the Assembly on February 20, 1962, A.I. 4909,
A.P. 5203; the second printing in the Senate was issued March 19, 1962, S.P. 4501 and
the Assembly on March 19, 1962, A.P. 5802. The whole bill was approved by the Senate
on March 30, 1962, and by the Assembly on March 30, 1962; it was signed into law by
Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller on April 24, 1962, as Chapter 686 of the Laws of 1962.
Certain sections of the law as passed by the Legislature were subsequently passed by both
houses and sent separately to the Governor, becoming Chapters 687, 700, 702 and 703
of the Laws of 1962.
15. The Committee functioned under the Chairmanship of Daniel G. Albert, and
included Harold F. McNiece, Jeremiah B. Bloom, Thomas Laverne, John Robert Brook,
Richard C. Lounsberry, John J. Ryan, David W. Peck, Alger A. Williams, John R. Davison.
16. Many changes may be pending or already passed into* law by the 1963 New
York State Legislature at the time of publication of this Law Review. It is recommended
that a careful check be made of current legislation to determine its effect on the jurisdic-
tion and procedures of the court, in connection with the several 'comments included in
this publication.
17. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 344-348, 622-631, 742-749, 832-836, 841.
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ground of the case, the reports of probation service and other agencies, may
be presented as an aid to the most effective disposition. This places the onus
of justifying the bringing of the proceeding on the petitioner and does not
permit the influencing of the court by information at that point of the case,
extraneous to it. If the petitioner cannot sustain the allegations made, as a
matter of due process the petition should be dismissed; it should allege facts,
not conclusions, as an exercise of basic legal principle. Under these circum-
stances the attorney can give his client full support on the adjudicatory hearing
and cooperate completely with the court on the dispositional.
For those persons without their own counsel, the statute not only permits
the court to assign counsel, but it establishes a new program of legal aid: the
law guardian. Whether he is to be a partisan representative in an adversary
proceeding, or a friend of the court as it seeks the best interests of the
respondent in those cases to which he is assigned, is still not clear. Legislative
intent as expressed in the Committee's report and in part in the statute seems
to indicate that it is the latter function, 18 but several sections show a tendency
to advocate a partisan approach. 19 There may be occasions when the court
should appoint a law guardian for a minor who has his own counsel, especially
when it is provided by his parents with whom his interests may not be in
accord.
The development of the specific concept of a dispositional hearing and
of counsel who have a supplementary function in the aid of the court has
presented a problem with reference to the materials and records available to
the judge on such hearing which are not adduced in court and are not subjedt
to the regular rules of evidence. The Committee determined first that such
information was confidential to the court and to the parties in interest, except
that medical and psychiatric data would be withheld from the parties in the
discretion of the court. However, since most family courts and their official
probation services are, in their functions as social agencies, members of social
service exchanges, there was universal disapproval of a mandatory disclosure
to the parties, so the final provisions which appear in several places permit
the court "in its discretion, [to] withhold from or disclose in whole or part to
18. "The Committee looks to the law guardians to assist the court, to insure against
any invasion of civil rights or violations of constitutional privileges, and supply the
Legislature and Governor with an independent view of the practical effect of the new
Act .. .to inform colleagues of the practices and needs of the Court." N.Y. Joint Legis.
Committee on Court Reorganization. Rep. II (The Family Court Act) 2 (1962). "...
counsel is often indispensable to a practical realization of due process of law and may be
helpful in making reasoned determinations of fact and proper orders of disposition. This
part establishes a system of law guardians to realize these purposes." N.Y. Family Ct.
Act § 241. See also §§ 343, 621, 741.
19. "At the request of a minor in a proceeding under articles three or seven or on
request of a parent or person legally responsible for the minor's care, the family court
shall appoint a law guardian to represent such minor if independent legal representation
is not available to the minor by reason of inability to pay other counsel or other circum-
stances. The family court on its own motion may make such appointment." N.Y. Family
Ct. Act § 249. The italicized portion did not appear in the original draft but was added
as the bill was introduced. See §§ 343, 741.
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the law guardian, counsel, party in interest, or other appropriate person"2 0
such confidential reports and information.
Attorneys appearing before the Family Court will find that their functions
in the preparation of petitions, moving papers, supplementary materials and
orders have been severely circumscribed. The court, state-wide, has developed
some one hundred thirty-five forms and plans more for use in the various matters
within the jurisdiction of the court.21 They are in many respects quite similar
and serve the uses of the court where attorneys do not appear. However,
fewer forms of a more general nature would actually prevent the anomaly of
discovering that these forms are in their very number too limited. Where they
have not been printed or are not available, counsel must prepare appropriate
papers subject to the usual powers of the court to review them and require
amendments: in any case, attorneys may conform to the Rules by using the
forms as a basis for their own papers.
I
JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDLGS AFFECTING JUVENILES IN THE FAMILY CoURT
A. Delinquency
The basic concern of the Family Court will continue to be that affecting
children, developing on the work of juvenile and children's courts over the
past century, in the pattern of the increasing sociological pressure to separate
children's matters from adult. Historically such a division came first in the
area of crime and delinquency and is still manifested as one result by the
constant rise in age limitations on criminal responsibility. Presently it is
sixteen years, although the Constitution refers to minors, and discussion has
been had on propositions suggesting further legislative expansion up to or
within this limitation of twenty-one years; one remnant of the former limita-
tions involves persons of the age of fifteen years who are involved in a capital
crime, and who may, by statute, be held accountable in an adult criminal
court.!
The Legislature, in defining the terms and categories of delinquent
children, has greatly reduced and divided the definitions which formerly ap-
peared in the Penal Law and Children's Court Laws, 2 which in their detailed
20. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 347, 435, 625, 746, 835 and 915. Note also the reference
to the use of such data by the law guardian in cases of non-support and family offense
where there is otherwise no requirement to appoint such an officer. See Kesseler v. Kesseler,
10 _N.Y.2d 445, 180 N.E.2d 402, 225 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1962) a child custody matter, where
the Court of Appeals discussed the philosophy of confidentiality of reports.
21. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 214.
1. Jurisdiction of such children is restricted from the Family Court by § 715 of the
Family Court Act, and may only be created by action of the District Attorney, the Grand
Jury and/or the Judge of the Criminal Court under §§ 312(b) to 312(g) inclusive of the
Code of Criminal Procedure.
2. See former N.Y. Children's Ct. Act § 2(2) & (3), former N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. Act
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listings were confining and restrictive. The present definition of a juvenile
delinquent is "a person over seven and less than sixteen years of age who
does any act which, if done by an adult, would constitute a crime." 3 A new
category and concept has been created to provide for children now excluded
from this limited definition. It is "person in need of supervision" and "means
a male less than sixteen years of age and a female less than eighteen years of
age who is an habitual truant or who is incorrigible, ungovernable or habitually
disobedient and beyond the lawful control of parent or other lawful authority. ' 4
Further, there is written into the law legislative purposes and intent, "to provide
a due process of law (a) for considering a claim that a person is a juvenile
delinquent or a person in need of supervision, and (b) for devising an appro-
priate order of disposition for any person adjudged juvenile delinquent or in
need of supervision." 5
No similar statement or one even derivative to it appeared in any of the
prior laws, except, in small part, the Girls' Term Act.6 It establishes clearly
the climate under which the law shall be interpreted and specifically sets aside
the majority decision in People v. Lewis,7 a basic case to former Children's
Court procedures. There, a divided court indicated that the Legislature had wide
discretion in prescribing processes of law in juvenile cases, that evidence of
the commission of specified acts was only relevant as an aid to the Children's
Court judge in seeking the reasons-behind the child's conduct and procedures
for helping him. The Court stated that the statute "clearly and unmistakably
abolishes the distinction" between classes of children brought before the court
for causes of neglect or delinquency, and "the concept of crime and punishment
disappears .... 8 Since the proceeding was not a criminal one, there was neither
right to nor necessity for the procedural safeguards prescribed by constitution
§ 2(15) & (16), as well as N.Y. Penal Law § 486 as it read prior to amendment effective
September 1, 1962: A juvenile delinquent is
a child (a) who violates any law or any municipal ordinance or who commits
any act which, if committed by an adult, would be a crime, except any child fifteen
years of age who commits any act which if committed by an adult would be a
crime punishable by death or life imprisonment, unless an order removing the
action to the children's court has been made .. . ; (b) who is incorrigible, un-
governable, or habitually disobedient and beyond the control of his parents, guard-
ian, custodians or other lawful authority; (c) who is habitually truant; (d) who,
without just cause and without the consent of his parent, parents, guardians or
other custodian, repeatedly deserts his home in violation of law, or who associates
with immoral or vicious persons; (f) who frequents any place the existence of
which is in violation of law; (g) who habitually uses obscene or profane language;
(h) who begs or solicits alms or money in public places under any pretense; or
(i) who so deports himself as to wilfully injure or endanger the morals or health
of himself or others.
As now amended Penal Law § 487 provides: "All cases involving the commitment or
trial of children otider the age of sixteen years, for any violation of law shall be heard
and determined by the family court in accord with the family court act."
3. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 712(a).
4. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 712(b).
S. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 711.
6. Former N.Y.C. Crim. Cts. Act, Girls' Term § 1.
7. 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932).
8. Id. at 176, 183 N.E. 353, at 354.
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and statute in criminal cases. The dissent queried whether the constitution
was protective only of adults, so that "a child [might] be incarcerated and
deprived of his liberty in a public institution by calling that which is a
crime by some other name"; and further distinguished between continuing
conduct which is non-criminal yet destructive to the child and to society, and
the specific act and "charge of crime, called out of charity, 'juvenile delin-
quency.'"9 The philosophy of the minority is not yet fully implemented al-
though it is significantly incorporated in the law by provision for disposition
and treatment as an integral part of these new definitions. These changes are
not merely a matter of semantics; they are creating serious challenges to the
courts and to the total community in the impact they have on the functions
and concepts of the Family Court.
The justification for early reforms in the concept of criminal responsibility
in children was that self-restraint and self-discipline cannot be expected of
persons of tender years, so that their acts should be treated as civil in nature
rather than as criminal. This permitted the court and society to offer rehabili-
tation and reform to such children rather than punishment upon a finding
of delinquency. It has become increasingly clear, however, that such an adjudi-
cation, while it establishes no criminal record, can have a damaging effect
on the status of the child in the community, to his future contacts with such
as the armed forces and the probation service. It became a term of opprobrium
so that the Children's Court might hesitate to make a proper and necessary
judgment of delinquency to avoid such stigma to a young person in trouble,
thus depriving him of the help and counseling which would rehabilitate him
and would redound to the benefit of the whole community. By common under-
standing, delinquency consisted of criminal activities commited by persons
under certain ages, so the change in the new law reflects more accurately the
general conception; perhaps, the term "person in need of supervision" may one
day have an aura of public distaste attached to it, but presently it is vague and
undistinguishable enough so that there is no acceptance of the term as one
of disapproval. It relieves the court, too, of the necessity of substituting a
petition of neglect for that of delinquency, when this is similarly inappropriate
to the circumstances of the case. While generalizations of the causes, manifesta-
tions and solutions of juvenile delinquency are impossible to make, the case
statistics would seem to indicate that boys will be more likely to be delinquent,
and girls will come before the court for the most part as persons in need of
supervision.
The resultant procedural changes now require that there be set forth
fully in the petition which brings the child to the attention ot the court, the
9. Id. at 179, 183, 183 N.E. 353, at 356, 357. The Lewis case was discussed recently
in People v. James, 9 N.Y.2d 82, 211 N.Y.S.2d 170, 172 N.E.2d 552 (1961), which
involved a wayward minor proceeding against a sixteen year old; the court distinguished
the forum and the statute involved and specifically refused to "re-examine the doctrine
announced in the Lewis case."
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allegations of the act or acts complained of, which must then be proved by a
preponderance of competent, material and relevant evidence, specifically in-
cluding uncorroborated confessions made in court.10 Jurisdiction is invoked
by the filing of a petition by the parent or other person legally responsible for
the child's care, an agency representative or a peace officer, or someone allegedly
injured by the child or a witness thereto." The determinative age is as of the
time the act or acts complained of allegedly arose, so that delinquency pro-
ceedings could be instituted subsequent to the sixteenth birthday; if they are
begun past the eighteenth birthday, the court must, in matters involving
persons in need of supervision, dismiss the petition, and may retain or dismiss
in its discretion, delinquency petitions, based on the probability of success
of rehabilitative procedures.' 2 Venue is had in the county where the acts
alleged in the petition occur, but the court may, for good cause, transfer the
proceedings to another jurisdiction."
Detention of a child pending disposition of the proceeding has created
many troublesome problems, not only to the Committee in the developing of
the provisions of the Family Court Act,'4 but subsequently in the enforcement
of those provisions by the Court and agencies including the police. The distinc-
tion between the categories of delinquency and person in need of supervision
determines the use of detention facilities and may mean that the children
most in need of temporary care in a closed facility cannot be held or helped.
Under certain circumstances, a child may be taken into custody and detained
before a petition is filed,' 5 but must be brought before the court within forty-
eight hours for a preliminary determination of whether jurisdiction exists over
him. 16 After the filing of a petition, the court may, in its discretion, direct
detention or release the child; detention may be had only where there is
10. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 731, 732, 742, 744. As originally drawn, the draft of the
Act excluded any uncorroborated admission of the respondent, but this was unduly
restrictive of juvenile court procedures so that the changes were made. Statements made
out of court should be brought into evidence by usual procedures and weighed in connec-
tion with corroboration.
11. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 733. Persons not familiar with the functioning of these
courts are most often shocked by the large proportion of cases instituted by parents against
their own children, although this is usually on advice of other agencies or counselors.
12. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 714.
13. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 717.
14. Detention procedures for juveniles in New York City had been the basis of
serious agitation for reform for several years, led by such persons as Presiding Justice
Bernard Botein of the First Appellate Division. Detention facilities were crowded to such
a point that serious conditions were generated and exploded too often; children were
retained for unreasonable periods of time and then their cases might often be dismissed;
no real attempt could be made to diagnose and begin to solve problems. In other areas
of the State, however, the courts and agencies had developed effective detention procedures,
so that they were a part of the rehabilitative program from the inception of the child's
contact with the Children's Court. The detention population has been cut in New York
City but the judges and social agencies in the rest of the State are of the opinion that
their work has been hampered to the serious disadvantage of the child.
15. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 712-722.
16. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 729. Originally only twenty-four hours was recommended
and there is now current pressure to extend the time to seventy-two hours to cover week-
ends and holidays.
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substantial probability that the respondent will not appear on the return
date or that before that time he may do an act which if committed by an
adult would be a crime.' 7
Custodial facilities are not defined by the Act, but are to be designated
by the rules of the court, which in their turn leave to the Appellate Division
the choice of places of detention.'$ One of the more startling omissions was
the provision under the former laws that no child could be placed in or com-
mitted to any place where he could come into contact with any adult convicted
of or charged with a crime; under these provisions separate places of detention
had to be provided for the most part by the courts themselves. 10 The only
reference now in the law to separate facilities is for separate hearings held,
insofar as possible, apart from regular courtrooms.2 0 Both the Constitution
and the Family Court Act establish restrictions about the religion of custodial
persons or agencies, which the statute has extended even further to the proba-
tion officers working with the children.2 1
Upon the several hearings provided for in the Act, the court must advise
the child and his parent or other person legally responsible for his care, of
the right of the child to remain silent and to be represented by counsel or
by a law guardian assigned by the court. 2 While the general public may be
excluded by the court, representatives of authorized agencies and interested
persons may be admitted to hearings involving children under article VII.2:
17. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 728, 739. Most judges are exercising their discretion
under these sections to enable them to hold such child for remedial work. By the first
section, the Court is required to release the person in need of supervision, and as originally
written, such a child was also to be released after the petition was filed. A second draft
of § 739 included children in both categories but still made no realistic approach to the
problem presented by a truant, runaway, promiscuous child who might harm himself but
not others.
18. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 724(b)(iii). N.Y.R. Family Ct. 7.1.
19. Former N.Y. Children's Ct. Act § 21; former N.Y. Doam. Rel. Ct. Act § 82; former
N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Act, Girls' Term Ct. § 14. Occasionally on commitment of a child by the
Court to a hospital for psychiatric care, he might be held in the same wards as adult
prisoners sent in for similar diagnosis, putting the court in the dubious position of violating
the law itself.
20. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 163.
21. N'.Y. Const. art. VI, § 32: "When any Court having jurisdiction over a child
shall commit it or remand it to an institution or agency or place it in the custody of any
person by parole, placing out, adoption or guardianship, the child shall be committed or
remanded or placed, when practicable, in an institution or agency governed by persons, or
in the custody of a person, of the same religious persuasion as the child." N.Y. Family
Ct. Act § 252(c): "Where there is a sufficient number of probation officers of the same
religious faith as that of a child to be placed on probation, the child shall be placed on
probation with a probation officer of the same religious faith as that of the child." See
also N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 116, which was amended three times before the final form was
accepted, and §§ 446 and 759.
22. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 728 and 741. In the former the conjunction is "and"
and in the latter "or." This leaves the function of the law guardian in doubt since by one
section the child has a right to have his services in addition to counsel, and in tei other
in lieu of counsel. The implication would be that the role of the law guardian is not
adversary.
23. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 741(b). Originally the Committee made it mandatory
to exclude the public, but the draft was amended to permit attorneys, social workers,
students, and other persons having a substantial interest in the Court to be admitted.
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Upon the conclusion of the adjudicatory hearing, the court, if it finds the
allegations of the petition have been sustained, will adjudicate the child a
juvenile delinquent or a person in need of supervision and proceed to a dis-
positional hearing2 4
The statute has continued its differentiation in these two adjudicative
categories and provides for the placement of a child in need of supervision
in its home, with a relative or other private person, with an authorized
agency, or youth opportunity center, for an original period of eighteen months
with possible extensions of one year each 235 Under the Act a child ad-
judicated delinquent may be committed to an institution of the state or an
authorized agency for a period not in excess of three years.26 Other dispositions
might be probation or suspended judgment.27 The distinction between place-
ment and commitment has created many problems in the effective functioning
of the law and provoked attempt either to interpret the statute to permit the
placement of persons in need of supervision in state training schools2 or to
seek amendment of the legislation to give greater discretion to the court
in the disposition of these cases. If the distinction in treatment of these
juveniles is continued in the next Legislature, there will be a greater burden
placed upon private institutions to take these persons in need of supervision,
who often need more confinement and supervision. Such institutions will have
to expand their services and amehd their charters to try to meet their
problems.20 If the child remains in the home and in the community, the rules
of the court set forth specifically the conditions which will control his behavior
and his relationships with parents, guardians and probation officers.30
New hearings and reconsideration of the order of the court may be had
for good cause at any time; successive petitions are permitted within ninety
days of the denial of each one.31 Agencies may have to bring petitions in their
own behalf when they are unable to continue the care,32 and the child may be
brought before the court at any time on failure to comply with the terms of
24. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 741-753.
25. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 756.
26. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 758. Note that children of fifteen years are to be re-
ferred to more stringent institutions.
27. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 753, 754, 755, 757.
28. Judge George A. Timone of the New York City Family Court, on October 1,
1962, ruled that the Court had jurisdiction to place a child adjudicated in need of super-
vision in a state training school, even though she bad not done an act which, if done by
an adult, would constitute a crime. In re Jane Doe, 36 Misc. 2d 611, 232 N.Y.S. 2d 715(Family Ct. 1962). He examined the Social Welfare Law under which such institutions
were administered and the legislative history of these sections of the Family Court Act and
interpreted "authorized agency" to mean a state training school. He indicated she could
be placed there, not committed, so that there could be a longer period of control over her.
29. Attorneys who represent private agencies may have to inquire into such problems
as the Membership Corporation Law, Social Welfare Law, fair employment practices, its
own constitution and by-laws, qualifications of personnel, limitations on admission policies,
secondary placement procedures, policies on referrals and repetitioning to the court.
30. N.Y.R. Family Ct. 7.5, 7.6.
31. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 761-768.
32. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 771-774.
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the previous orders. 33 No adjudication is denominated a conviction; nor is
the child, adjudicated a juvenile delinquent or a person in need of supervision,
a criminal, so that his rights and privileges will not be harmed.34 While
the records are not to be used as evidence in any other court, they may be
used by such other court in sentencing an adult and considering his childhood
record; police records are similarly closed to all public view, but they can
be used for good cause on a written order of the Family Court.35
B. Neglect
Proceedings to protect and to provide for those children who may be
neglected are also one of the traditional areas of jurisdiction of the Family
Court and its predecessor courts, the Act specifically continuing the powers
of the prior courts. 36 The concept was one of broad application under the
former law, however, and the definitions were, as they were for juvenile
delinquency, specific, long and limiting in their attempt to be inclusive.37
The Committee determined to use the popular interpretation of neglect as
one of failure to give proper physical care and removed all other manifesta-
tions of lack of attention to needs of the child such as psychological to the
new concept, "person in need of supervision."
Under the former law, when the court did not consider that a determina-
tion of juvenile delinquency was justified, it would substitute a petition in
neglect; in order circumstances, well meaning but misguided parents or guard-
ians, who did not deserve to be adjudicated neglectful, could not receive help
in any other way. The age jurisdiction is varied in the new definition of
neglected child; the Act extends the protection of the court to age eighteen
for girls and sixteen for boys. Such a child is thus one "(a) whose parent or
33. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 776-779.
34. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 781, 782.
35. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 783, 784.
36. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 311. This provision did not appear in the first draft but
was added later. In the Committee's opinion, there was a serious failure of due process and
lack of judicial responsibility in such matters; however agencies and persons traditionally
interested in the neglected child persuaded the Committee to make amendments reflecting
procedures they considered satisfactory.
37. Former N.Y. Children's Ct. Act § 2(4), former N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. Act § 2(17).
The first, for example, prior to amendment, read: "'Neglected child' means a child (a)
who is without proper guardianship; (b) whose parent, guardian or person with whom
the child lives, by reason of cruelty, mental incapacity, immorality or depravity is unfit to
properly care for such child; (c) who is under unlawful or improper care, supervision,
custody or restraint by any person, corporation, agency, association, institution, society,
or other organization or who is unlawfully kept out of school; (d) who wanders about
without lawful occupation or restraint; (e) whose parent, guardian or custodian neglects
or refuses, when able to do so, to provide necessary medical, surgical, institutional or
hospital care for such child; (f) who is found in any place the existence of which is in
violation of law; (g) who is in such condition of want or suffering or is under such
improper guardianship or control as to injure or endanger the morals or health of himself
or others; (h) who is a permanently placed child as defined in subdivision 12 of this
section whose care, control, or custody by the person with whom such child is permanently
placed is contrary to the moral or temporal interest of such child; or (i) who is a per-
manently neglected child as defined in subdivision thirteen of this section."
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other person legally responsible for his care does not adequately supply the
child with food, clothing, shelter, education, or medical or surgical care
though financially able or offered financial means to do so; or (b) who suffers
or is likely to suffer serious harm from the improper guardianship, including
lack of moral supervision or guidance, of -his parents or other person legally
responsible for his care and requires the aid of the court; or (c) who has
been abandoned or deserted by his parents or other person legally responsible
for his care." 38
This article of the Family Court Act establishes the same quandary,
posed elsewhere in its provisions, by the term "exclusive original jurisdiction."3"9
The penal provisions on such offenses as desertion and abandonment have not
been amended or repealed; hence the authorities may still proceed to prosecute
those who have committed a crime in failing to fulfill their obligations in rela-
tion to a child.40 The Family Court, however, has no criminal jurisdiction;
so such prosecution would have to be brought in the appropriate court of
criminal jurisdiction; it does have the power to fine or imprison upon a finding
that its order has been violated. Since the primary purpose of the law is to
provide for and to protect the child, such cases must be brought primarily to
the Family Court. Most of them affect children who are literally, as well as
legally, infants; and so are completely helpless, defenseless and require im-
mediate and effective action.
The former law included in its general provisions, all matters involving
delinquent, neglected and dependent children; 41 thus this separate article in
the Family Court Act is generally an innovation, subject to interpretation
and implementation by the courts, subject also to careful scrutiny by attorneys
who are interested in specific cases, in the child, or in the family. Although
it was considered unnecessary by some authorities to distinguish between
delinquency and neglect matters, dealing with the welfare of children, actual
differences do require a varied approach. Neglect proceedings affect very
young children for the most part, and the acts complained of, the taking into
custody and the terms of the judgment and order, are concerned with the
parent or other guardian. Delinquency cases on the other hand concern, for the
most part, children entering puberty, and petitions, hearings, and orders
directly involve them.
Since these problems usually arise on an- emergency basis, the statute
provides for unusual facility in making immediate removals. When the life
or health of a child is in so imminent danger, that continuing in the home
situation would be impossible, a peace officer may remove such child without
the consent of the parent and without an order for temporary removal, provided
38. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 312.
39. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 313.
40. N.Y. Penal Law §§ 480, 482; N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 899.
41. See, e.g., former N.Y. Children's Ct. Act §§ 2, 10, 22, 30, 40; former N.Y. Doma.
Rel. Ct. Act §§ 61, 71, 72, 74, 83.
BUFFALO LATV REVIEW
the parents are informed of the removal and the child is taken to a place
designated by the court -.4 2 Otherwise, there are provisions in the law for removal
with consent or by court order on petition of any interested person. 43 The
initiative to take the matter to court is not entirely with the social agencies
in that provision is made for application by the parent or guardian for the
return of the child.4 - In any case, the court may not proceed with any hearing
until it finds that the parent or guardian is present or that every attempt has
been made to secure service of notice and a copy of the petition; a rehear-
ing must be granted where the parent was absent for reasons other than a
willful refusal to attend.45 These matters, involving the direct conflict of the
rights of the parent and child in their interrelationships, are particularly
within the purposes of the statute to protect the legal and constitutional
rights of the parties in stressing the advice of right to counsel and the use
of the law guardian to protect the child's best interests&Y Where the child
has been removed from the home, preferences are provided in the Act to
ensure a speedy disposition of the matter 4 7
The adjudicatory hearing is held to determine whether the allegations of
the petition have been established by a fair preponderance of the evidence,
and the court may at its conclusion dismiss the petition or make a determina-
tion that the record does not show that its aid is required.48 It may enter an
adjudication of neglect if the evidence sustains such, and proceed to disposi-
tion by suspending judgment, discharge the child to the parent or guardian
under an order of protection or supervision, or place the child elsewhere. 4 9
Unlike -other civil or criminal matters, the finding of the court is not a matter
of res adjudicata or double jeopardy on any subsequent proceeding brought in
relation to the same parties. The court or any interested person may enter a
proceeding at any time to move to stay execution of, arrest, set aside, modify
or vacate any order; 50 parties may act upon changing circumstances and make
successive petitions even after denial under very generous statutory enact-
ments.5 1 It is possible, since the grounds are broad and vague, to try for
amendment even without generally sufficient cause, to persuade the court to
reevaluate its findings. -5 2
Proceedings in neglect never result in the final removal of the child
from the parent or guardian; all placements are temporary under these
procedures. However, many children placed by parents or by the court with
42. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 324, 325.
43. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 321, 322, 323.
44. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 328.
45. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 341, 342.
46. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 343.
47. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 349.
48. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 344, 351.
49. N.Y. Family CL Act §§ 352-357.
50. N,.Y. Family Ct. Act § 361.
51. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 366.
52. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 362, 364, 365.
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individuals or agencies have been ignored by the parents for years. Since there
was no parental consent, or because these neglect orders could not terminate
custody, such abandoned children could not be placed for adoption, although
their best interests would indicate the validity of such a course. A new
category of "permanently neglected child" was added to the law in 1961 3 to
enable the court under proper procedures to terminate custody, to release a
child for adoption, and to relieve society of his permanent care. Since this
law is in derogation of all natural rights, it must be strictly and absolutely
followed; otherwise, counsel for the natural parents may attack any order as
defective, and counsel for an agency or adoptive parents may establish rights
only upon strict adherence to all proper procedures.
The Family Court Act follows closely the original law in defining the
category 54 although in earlier drafts the Committee attempted to reduce the
verbiage. Because of the patchwork wording of this section, and the subjective,
determinative role of the social agency, the court and counsel for all parties
should demand specific instances and proof within the statute and not con-
clusions or restatements of the law.55 The prior law consisted mainly of
definitions of such permanently neglected child and an outline of procedures
for service of summons. The new Family Court Act sets forth in detail juris-
diction, procedures and criteria to be followed. The Social Welfare Law
provides for an order of the Surrogate or Family Court judge to grant
custody to the social agency; it is questionable whether the Surrogate has
and should accept jurisdiction since the only procedures in this matter are in
the Family Court Act.
Procedures are set forth in detail in the statute, and care is especially
warranted in the matter of securing jurisdiction over the absent parent in the
matter of proof of service or attempts therefore. 56 If the parent does appear,
there is provision for advice as to right to counsel, but a requirement in the
same section in the original proposal as to appointment of law guardian was
stricken from the next drafts and from the final bill. The court should still
exercise its discretion in assigning the law guardian; the social agency is not
in such a sufficiently disinterested position to be charged with representing fully
the rights of the minor in relation to the parents.57 After the adjudicatory
53. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 448, 449, 450, amending N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 111,
N.Y. Children's Ct. Act § 2(13), and N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. Act § 2(24).
54. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 611.
55. See In re Lewis, 35 Misc. 2d 117, 230 N.Y.S.2d 481 (Surr. Ct. 1962), (decided
before the inception of the Family Court Act under the old law and procedures). There the
court held the agency had not sustained its burden of proof on the alleged abandonment,
by the mother. "Our courts have defined the term 'abandonment' as neglect and refusal
to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support .... It would appear to
this court, however, that such neglect and refusal must be a willful and not an involuntar"
neglect or refusal caused by illness, financial difficulties or the inability to assume the
responsibilities of parenthood due to temporary emotional and mental disturbances." 35
Misc. 2d 117, at 120, 230 N.Y.S.2d 481, at 484, 485.
56. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 616, 617.
57. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 621; N.Y. Family Ct. Act Article II, Part 4.
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hearing, the court may dispose of the matter by dismissing the petition,
suspending judgment or terminating the custody in the parent, and awarding
to the petitioner under conditions it may impose5
8
C. Adoption
Under the Constitution and the Family Court Act, the court could then
entertain a proceeding for the adoption of such a minor removed from the
custody of the natural parents, as it has jurisdiction over all adoptions. While
this is not a new jurisdiction to the predecessor Children's Court, interpreta-
tion of the power of the court to hear and grant adoptions varied throughout
the state. Some judges felt that their powers extended only to such children
who were otherwise before the court and that other courts had to accept the
majority of adoptions.39 Thus, the Constitution clarifies this possible conflict
in awarding jurisdiction of all adoptions, even of adults, to the Family Court.
Of course, the supreme court would always have original jurisdiction of these
matters as it has of all others.60 The Family Court Act is unreasonably brief
in its adoption provisions, although it does permit the court to use its proba-
tion service to act for it in securing data on which to base a decision. Counsel,
must, therefore, use carefully the provisions of Article Seven and the Domestic
Relations Law governing adoptions and refer to the Rules of the Family Court,
which are most specific in these matters.61
The Adoption Law was amended generally in 1961.62 The Albert Com-
mittee, in writing the Family Court Act, indicated that additional amendments
to the Domestic Relations Law would be necessary to bring it into conformity
with the purposes and procedures of the Family Court. However, any sub-
stantial review was deferred until greater experience had been had with the
workings of the new court. The major change in 1961 was to separate private
58. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 631-634; N.Y.R. Family Court 6A.1.
59. Former N.Y. Children's Ct. Act § 6(1): "The Court shall have like jurisdiction
and authority as is now conferred on county and surrogate's courts as concerns adoption
and guardianship of the person of children under the jurisdiction of the court." Former
N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. Act § 61(1): ".... and shall also have jurisdiction to appoint guardians
of the person and guardians ad litem of such children, and to grant orders for the adoption
of such children." In both laws, the children who were under the jurisdiction of the court
were delinquent, material witnesses, mentally defective, neglected, physically handicapped,
abandoned; see preceding matters in these same sections of the law.60. In Application of Smith 7 A.D.2d 344, 183 N.Y.S.2d 511 (3d Dep't 1959),
a 7'd without opinion, 6 N.Y.2d 941, 161 N.E.2d 219, 190 N.Y.S.2d 1008, the Appellate
Division ruled the proper forum was the Supreme Court and added:
So far as jurisdiction in adoption proceedings is concerned the statutory scheme
does not give to the Supreme Court the power to grant or abrogate adoptions
per se. The Supreme Court, however, as the guardian of all infants has inherent
powers to decide custody in a proper case by way of habeas corpus, or even by a
direct petition invoking the chancery powers of the Court, and in the exercise of
its broad jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has ample power to promote the welfare
of a child notwithstanding a legal adoption; indeed there is authority to indicate
it may question-the validity of an adoption or even annul the same.
61. For the most part the Rules merely paraphrase the statute. Only in the matter of
adoptions, are they detailed and voluminous as to procedures and requirements.
62. See N.Y. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 147.
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placement adoptions from agency adoptions, providing separate rules and
protections for each. Generally, there are more likely to be challenges to the
private adoptions; the intervention of the agency, as the Custodial party giving
consent to the adoption, lessens the chances of success of any action in abroga-
tion or attacking the validity of the adoption by the natural parent.63
Forms have been provided by the Family Court in adoptions as in all
of the other matters before the court 64 and require the submission and filing of
the papers under the name of the child as shown by the birth record. 5 The
Rules specify the supporting papers which must be provided; they are more
than those required in adoptions before the courts of prior jurisdiction and
the Surrogate's Court.60 After the papers are submitted, the Rules provide for
the designation of a disinterested person or authorized agency, including the
probation service of the court, to verify the allegations of the petition, to
investigate and report according to the Domestic Relations Law. They further
require that the parties be informed of the investigation and cooperate with
it.67 Consents of the natural parent may be secured by representatives of the
adoptive parties prior to appearance in court, but provision is made for the
requirement by the court, in its discretion, of a new and confirmatory consent
executed in its presence. Withdrawal of consent is usually more difficult in
agency adoptions than private placement, but the courts have lately been
63. But see People v. New York Foundling Hospital, 17 A.D.2d 122, 232 N.Y.S.2d
479 (1st Dep't 1962), where a habeas corpus proceeding was brought by the mother against
the agency to which she had surrendered the child and when adoption was already pending.
The application was denied, and the Appellate Division affirmed, but on the basis that
there was grave doubt whether the mother had stabilized her own relationships as to be
entitled to the return of the child and on the question of the welfare of the child. Surrender
ii not absolute if the court determines that the best interests of the child are at stake,
and the Court stated that the operational needs or inconvenience, or frustration of author-
ized agencies is not sufficient counterweight. See also People v. Shepsky, 305 N.Y. 465,
113 N.E.2d S01 (1953); Application of Handler, 6 A.D.2d 977, 176 N.Y.S.2d 689 (3d
Dep't 1958). In McGaffin v. Family & Children's Service of Albany, 7 A.D.2d 769,
179 N.Y.S.2d 948, (3d Dep't 1958), the mother attempted to revoke consent given two
years earlier. While the court protected the corporation, it stressed it might not do so on a
showing of over-reaching, wrongdoing or knowledge of such agency.
64. Adoption forms vary slightly from those which attorneys themselves have pre-
pared in such proceedings in the past; it is suggested counsel try to secure these forms
from the Family Court, but if they are not yet available, to draw them in accordance
with the Domestic Relations Law and the Rules of the Family Court. They are: petition,
agreement and consent, attorney's affidavit, order, and Health Department application
for change of name.
65. There is presently an agitation to use the adoptive name of the child in the
title; the rest of the file is sealed, but the petition and order now reveal the birth name
of the child and open the door to psychological pressures which the sealing seeks to avoid.
66. They include a verified petition with certified copy of the birth record attached;
agreement and consent properly signed and acknowledged before the court; attorney's
affidavits of identification; proposed order of adoption with copies for certification:
marriage certificates; death certificate or divorce decree if a marriage has been terminated;
supplementary affidavits setting forth facts making consent unlecessary; affidavit of
custody, abandonment and release to agency if such a proceeding took place, and affidavit
of agency investigation with copy of transfer from welfare department or other agency
or certified copy of surrender; and such other papers as the court may require.
67. See N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law §§ 112(5), 116.
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more protective of the rights of the natural parent, mother 8 or father.0 0
Requirements of duration of residence with the adoptive parents prior to
the final order varies in the Domestic Relations Law with the type of adoption.
In either case the court may dispense with it for good reason. 0 However, the
Family Court Rules require that the six-month residence be computed from
the date of the filing of the agreement and petition in all cases and limit the
power of the judge to waive it.71 The order of adoption will be filed in the
Family Court Clerk's Office, not the County Clerk's Office. Adoptions, being
statutory in creation and nature and affecting so many other areas of the
law, are subject to attack on serious jurisdictional and statutory bases. Hence,
extreme care should be exercised in complying with all the requirements. The
judge of the court in which the order of adoption was made, may open, vacate
or set aside such order for fraud, newly discovered evidence or other sufficient
cause, 72 but abrogation is not easy. The courts charge the adoptive parents
with the same obligations of natural parents to support and care for a child
who may become handicapped and generally refuse to consider this any
basis for a cancellation of responsibilities voluntarily assumed earlier.
D. Custody
The problem of custody has always been within the purview of the Family
Court and its predecessor courts, and jurisdiction is now continued and widened.
However, in the implementing legislation, the only separate reference to
custody matters appears in connection with possible references from the
supreme court in habeas corpus and matrimonial proceedings.7 3 Otherwise, all
68. See People v. Anonymous, 10 N.Y.2d 332, 179 N.E.2d 200, 222 N.Y.S.2d 945(1961), where the lower court dismissed a writ of habeas corpus of the mother, the
Appellate Division reversed, and the Court of Appeals again reversed with several dissenting
opinions. The majority based its decision on the character of the petitioner; presumably,
if her reputation were unblemished she might have prevailed. The case was distinguished
in In re Adoption of Anonymous, 32 Misc. 2d 683, 223 N.Y.S.2d 792 (Surr. Ct. 1962),
which permitted withdrawal of consent.
69. Abandonment by the father must be proved to enable the stepfather to ask the
court to waive consent of the father, former husband of his wife. See In Re Anonymous,
31 Misc. 2d 262, 220 N.Y.S.2d 85 (Surr. Ct. 1961) and In Re Adoption of Anonymous,
31 Misc. 2d 324, 220 N.Y.S.2d 910 (Surr. Ct. 1961).
70. In agency adoptions the foster child must reside with the adoptive parents
at least six months before the order of adoption is made; the practice has been to wait
six months then bring the petition and order in at once. In private placement adoption,
the order of adoption cannot be made until six months after the filing of the petition,
which is in addition to the six month's residence. In the court's discretion, the two six-
month periods could run concurrently.
71. N.Y.R. Family Ct. 6 B.6(c) (b).
72. See _N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 114. A serious problem is presented here since
many adoptions have been processed by the County Court which no longer has jurisdic-
tion. Soon the Surrogate's Court will be without jurisdiction as well, if it is not already.
Consideration should be given to the amending of this section to enable another court
of original jurisdiction to reopen an order of adoption granted by a court which had
jurisdiction, but has now lost it. See In re Adoption of Jeffrey, 36 Misc. 2d 231, 232
_N.Y.S.2d 354 (Family Ct. 1962), where the Family Court of Broome County denied a
suspended judgment on a petition for abrogation. The court held that it had jurisdiction
of the matter as successor to the Children's Court which had granted the order of adoption.
73. N.Y. Family Ct. Act. §§ 651-653, 467-468.
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of the other articles of the Family Court Act provide for disposition of custody
in hearings in neglect, support, delinquency and supervision, paternity, family
offense. The court has the right in any of these matters to inquire into the
proper disposition of the custody of the child for its best interests. There is
no absolute right in either parent, of course, and the cases turn upon the
factual circumstances. The court will have more facilities available for the
purpose of making an independent investigation into the case, beyond the
testimony given by each party.
A more difficult problem exists in the issues raised in visitation rights by
the parent who does not have custody. Generally, the court is empowered to
make any order in matters within its jurisdiction to permit and establish
times and rules of visitation.74 Where the parent whose rights are not so
established is not otherwise before the court, there is no specific procedure
set forth in the law to inquire into the problem. The article on support con-
tains a section permitting the court to "make an order of custody or of
visitation requiring one parent to permit the other to visit the children at
stated periods without an order of protection" 75 in the absence of a supreme
court order on the issue76 even when the parents are divorced and the support
order is for a child only. The clause as written amended the first draft which
followed the former law more closely. However, the prior law appeared in both
references to support jurisdiction and. to general jurisdiction.77 Although there
are no forms or rules provided on this section, it might- seem broad enough
to permit the court to accept jurisdiction of a petition in visitation in the
first instance instead of putting the parent in the position of having to be
brought in as a respondent in non-support proceedings and-raising the issue
then:78
While the Legislature was empowered to define guardianship jurisdiction
in the Family Court, it has not done much more than give "like jurisdiction
and authority as is now conferred on county and surrogates [sic] courts as
concerns the guardianship of the person of a minor under the jurisdiction of
the court."70 Thus, these cases are limited to children before the court in
relation to the other sections of the Act. The Committee indicated that it
74. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 115, 352-357, 446, 511, 611-634, 759, 842.
75. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 447.
76. An interesting case on the mater of visitation rights was brought as a habeas
corpus proceeding by the husband to restrain his divorced wife from removing the
children from New York to California. The Court described the father's rights of visita-
tion and access to his children as basic and natural and modified and limited the custody
of the mother to prevent the removal and to award visitation rights. Application of
Denberg, 34 Misc. 2d 980, 229 N.Y.S.2d 831 (Sup. Ct., 1962).
77. See former N.Y. Children's Ct. Act § 6(10) (b), and former N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct.
Act § 61(9)(b) and 92(7)(a) on general jurisdiction.
78. If the court refuses to accept a petition initiated in visitation, the question should
be referred to the Legislature; many fathers are living up to their dbligation to support
without a court order to this effect and are not within the jurisdiction of the court, yet
they are being deprived by the mother's actions of the right to see the child. It would
seem a most reasonable exercise of the powers of the court.
79. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 661.
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might be desirable later to expand it to proceedings originated for the purpose
of appointing a guardian over the person. Presently, Surrogate's Court exercises
jurisdiction over letters of guardianship of minors; rarely are these issued
separately. As authorities differentiate between personal care and upbringing
and property management, the change will be made requiring the attorney to
file petitions in two separate courts on the same child and his estate. Whether
the court will have cognizance of guardianship of the person created by deed'
or will is uncertain. The Rules of the Family Court provide that within the
current jurisdiction, the probation service may interview the persons involved
and obtain data to aid the court in its independent judgment, provided such
investigation is not exercised inconsistently with the law.80
E. Additional Jurisdiction
While children who need specialized care and treatment can be brought
to the attention of the court within the purview of the neglect statutes, the
Family Court Act also has specific jurisdiction over physically handicapped
and mentally defective children.8 ' It may order examination and treatmenf
when the child appears to need such and may further order reimbursement
of charges by parent or guardian in such amounts as are proper.8s2 When a
child is detained, placed or committed under the Act, the charges are to be
assumed by the appropriate county or city welfare department; but similarly
the parent or other person having the duty of support may be required to
contribute. s3 Children who are material witnesses in matters before other
courts are within the special protection of the Family Court, as in the prior
law, but the length of protective custody is limited.84 And as a court of
record, the Family Court may grant to the child the fees permitted by the
Code of Criminal Procedure.
sz
II
JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDINGS AFFECTING ADULTS IN THE FAILY COURT
The basic thesis in the development of the Family Court is that individual
problems or cases involving a child or an adult alone cannot be settled without
SO. N.Y.R. Family Ct. 6 D.1.
31. X.Y. Family Ct. Act, art. II, part 3, §§ 234 and 235 affecting New York City
and z§ 232 and 233 as to counties outside the City; there seems to be no justification for
the law to distinguish between children residing in New York City and those outside the
City. As written originally, and then as amended in several drafts, even after approval,
the statute shows its conformity to the separate pressure groups interested in different
handicaps and varying treatments. Policies of procedure, treatment and reimbursement under
the Family Court Act, the Social Welfare Law and the Mental Hygiene Law in these
matters should be reviewed and made consistent not only as to the needs and rights of
the child who requires help in any category, but as to a single statewide procedure.
82. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 232, 234.
83. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 233, 235. The requirement of reimbursement here miti-
gates against the opinion that commitment or placement is a deprivation of liberty or a
punishment in the same sense as the adult imprisonment.
84. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 158.
85. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 618(b).
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reference to the total family interrelationship and that basic maladjustments
in the family unit will have their effect upon children and their development.
For this reason, it was granted jurisdiction of the problems of non-support
and of family offenses1 with the expectation that the problems underlying
these serious manifestations of family disunity, which are such a drain upon
the community as well, could be better handled in the atmosphere of concilia-
tion and rehabilitation of the Family. Court rather than under limitations of
the criminal courts.
A. Support
Although there is no restriction in the Constitution against the assump-
tion of criminal jurisdiction in the new Family Court, the Legislative Com-
mittee determined that it would limit the court's procedures and powers to
civil ones only. It is the intention of the Legislature to remove from the
problems of family relationships the stigma of criminal charges, handling and
disposition. It was considered unrealistic to burden a defendant with a
criminal record of arrest and conviction of misdemeanors, even felonies, when
the intention of all parties was mainly to secure proper support, or restore
peace to a family. However, the continuation of the acts which come into
the "exclusive original jurisdiction" of the Family Court in their appropriate
places in the Penal Law or the Code of Criminal Procedure has created many
problems of interpretation and certain confusions on concurrent jurisdiction.
The Penal Law referring to the care of children, for example, has not
been amended; criminal charges may still be brought thereunder and criminal
penalties imposed.2 The actual fact of abandonment and failure to provide
support are prima facie evidence of the willful intent of the defendant, making
abandonment a felony, and failure to support, a misdemeanor. The Code
of Criminal Procedure also includes in its definition of a disorderly person,
one who abandons a wife or children without adequate support in accordance
with his means, so that this was often used as a less drastic charge.3 In most
of the cases brought under these sections, the prime purpose was to attempt
to make the husband-father live up to his responsibilities in the support of
his family.
The old Children's Court Act and Domestic Relations Court Act, how-
ever, gave exclusive original jurisdiction to the respective court whenever the
welfare of a child was concerned, subject to the jurisdiction of a court of
record in a civil action, to determine the liability of one who fails to provide
for the proper maintenance of wife or child. 4 With this seemingly dual juris-
1. N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 13(b).
2. N.Y. Penal Law § 480. Interestingly enough, this section proviies that where a
fine is imposed for its violation, the same may be applied to the support of the child. See
also §§ 481-482 therein.
3. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 899.
4. See former N.Y. Children's Ct. Act §§ 6, 30, and former N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. Act
§§ 61, 91.
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diction, the criminal courts retained those cases involving support froni the
standpoint of a criminal charge. These courts determined that there was a
differentiation between civil proceedings seeking to provide for the future
and criminal actions brought to punish failure to comply with legal obligations
in the past.3 Criminal charges are quite inappropriate to the purposes of
support, and the requirement of a bond in these cases for such future support
is not a consistent judgment in such a criminal forum. Thus, duplicate charges
can be brought against an absconding father, in the Family Court tA provide
for his family in the future and in the criminal court to punish him for his
willful failure to take care of them in the past.
,'Exclusive original jurisdiction of support proceedings under this article"0
(Emphasis added.) is provided in the Family Court Act, which is different from
the statements of jurisdiction in the former courts and also from the early
drafts of the Family Court Act. All of these enumerated and limited the pur-
poses and persons affected. This change has actually limited the jurisdiction
to. the purposes of the statute and any attempt to read criminal jurisdiction
into the Court, and in the alternative, to try to hold that criminal procedures
no longer exist because the Family Court cannot try them, is to expand the
Act beyond the intentions of the Legislature. The obligations established in
the statute are derived from the older laws and include the same measure of
support: that the respondent have "sufficient means or able to earn such
means." 7 Since even the wording is exactly the same as the former law, the
many cases interpreting the clause will be precedents for the court now in
adjudicating the question of means. Even when the man elects not to work, the
court can require specific support based on his capacity to earn and charge
him with violation of the order of the court, if he fails so to provide.8 Poor
relatives may also appear before the Family Court to secure support from
specified persons under statutory obligation but these relatives must be
recipients of public assistance or liable to become needful thereof.0
Venue for the filing of a petition in support is sufficiently broad that the
person in need can secure a forum easily and without unreasonable restriction.'"
Instead of "swearing out a warrant" the petitioner appears before the intake
department or probation service of the court to file a petition for support
5. See People v. Kenneweg, 28 Misc. 2d 999, 220 N.Y.S.2d 877 (Dist. Ct. 1960) where
the Nassau District Court questioned its jurisdiction of a nonsupport charge and held that
the Children's Court had exclusive jurisdiction of the civil prcoess but that it would
always have cognizance of the essentially criminal cases predicated on failure of the father
to provide for the family.
6. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 411.
7. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 412-414.
8. See, e.g., Lindley v. Lindley, 162 N.Y.S.2d 217 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Sirianni v. Sirianni,
127 N.Y.S.2d 387 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
9. X.Y. Family Ct. Act § 415. The poor relation must be the petitioner; there is no
provision in the law, for example, for one child to bring brothers and sisters before the
court for help in supporting the parent and if support is actually existent there may be
no need for welfare aid. See also N.Y. Social Welfare Law §§ 101, 110.
10. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 421.
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even on the basis of information and belief. The service is encouraged and
required, insofar as possible, to confer with the petitioner, the respondent,
and all interested parties, to attempt to adjust appropriate cases even to an
agreement which the court may incorporate in an enforceable order of support.
Such conciliation procedures are limited in length, and the petitioner may
never be estopped from demanding access to the court for the purpose of
filing the petition. 1 Civil process governs the serving of a summons, although
the statute gives specific permission for the issuance of a warrant; the arrest
procedures are also followed as in civil cases.12 Taken into custody under
warrant, the respondent must be brought before a Family Court judge who
may continue him in custody or require an undertaking; he may also provide
for temporary support when the petitioner's needs are urgent.' 3 Competent
proof of the allegations of the petition is required at the hearing, but both
husband and wife may be competent witnesses against each other and the means
of the husband to give support are presumed prima facie. 14 Of particular
interest to counsel for the wife, is the provision for attorney's fees in any
proceeding.'I Final orders include not only support by the various relatives
obligated to provide such, but an order of protection as well, in assistance of
the other orders.' 6
Since the court always retains jurisdiction, violation of its orders gives
it greater power to control and punish the respondent, and at this time im-
prisonment, probation, taking of property may be prescribed. 17 Salaries of the
respondent may be attached since the Family Court Act permits deductions
from wages of public employees and the Personal Property Law gives the
court power to order deductions from wages of persons employed in private
business or industry.'8 This is an important remedy, and its enforcement has
been approved, supported, and expanded by the courts.19 The power of the
11. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 423-425.
12. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 426-429.
13. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 431-434. Note the substitution of the words "hear" and
"hearing" for "try" and "trial" and the omission of any reference to "guilt" or "guilty."
14. N.Y. Family CL Act §§ 435-537.
15. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 438. Former N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. Act § 131 provided for
such fees, but the former N.Y. Children's Ct. Act made no such allowances; early drafts
of this new law were not as generous. In a proceeding brought by anyone but the wife no
such provision is made.
16. N.Y. Family CL Act §§ 441-447. There are many interesting changes here from
prior law. The amount of support in § 442 is not limited as it was in the Domestic Rela-
tions Court Act; the obligation of the father to contribute even where the mother is under
order to support is new in § 444. The order of protection in § 446 is an extention of a 1960
amendment to § 6(10) of the former Children's Court Act, and § 447 reiterates a new
proceeding of the former N.Y. Dom. Rd. Ct. Act § 92(7) (a).
17. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 454.
18. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 459; N.Y. Personal Prop. Law § 49(a).
19. See Feder v. Skyway Container Corp, 218 N.Y.S.2d 362 (Sup. Ct. App. Term
1961) where the court gave preference to the order for deductions for support over gar-
nishees for other judgments, in spite of a contrary opinion of the Attorney General of the
State of New York; In Doe v. Doe, 234 N.Y.S.2d 688 (Fain. Ct. N.Y.C. 1962), where
the Court demanded that the employer honor the order, and wrote a general opinion of
the problems involved in the discharge of employees who have such garnishees; see Downs
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court to order an undertaking creates an effective means of insuring the support
of the petitioners and their families; forfeitures are applied to such support.20
Further effective enforcement of support is provided by requiring banks and
other fiduciary institutions to give full data on any funds deposited with them
and to require employers to give complete information to the court with
reference to earnings of petitioner or respondent when requested to do so.21
The statute establishes a support bureau to receive and disburse funds paid
pursuant to any order of support, to report failure to pay to the probation
service: moneys paid therein vest in the recipient at once, unless there is a
question of reimbursement or where a child is involved. Provision is made for
return of unclaimed money making reference to the abandoned property
provisions.--
The Family Court has exclusive original jurisdiction over proceedings
under Article 3A of the Domestic Relations Law, known as the Uniform
Support of Dependents Law, which is in effect in all of the states and ter-
ritories. -ew York State was the first to put it into effect in 1949,23 and its
law is slightly different from all the other jurisdictions enforcing it. The
statute has been adjudicated as constitutional in the federal courts and will
become more important as public demand increases for enforcing support
from the absconding husband and father. Applications are made in the
appropriate court in petitioner's state and transmitted to the corresponding
court in the respondent's jurisdiction, where an answer and defense may be
taken and returned. The originating state takes such proof as it needs and
makes a recommendation to the respondent court, which has the opportunity to
examine and cross-examine the parties in court and by interrogatories as does
the petitioner. If upon the conclusion of their trial by correspondence, the
courts find the petitioner in need of support, the respondent court will issue
its order upon the recommendation of the initiating court, with due regard
for the parties' means and circumstances.
Judgments of support and custody in marital actions held in New York
State or in foreign jurisdictions may be reviewed and amended in the Family
Court.24 The court may inquire into any separation agreement and order
support in derogation of its terms if it is improvident.2 5 This power will
enable both parties to return under simplified proceedings to open any order
v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 233 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1962) an assignment of wages should
be honored across state lines.
20. X.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 471-479; these are similar to former N.Y. Children's Ct.
Act § 34-34(h) and former N. Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. Act §§ 151-158, so the interpretative cases
would be controlling.
21. X.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 228, 229.
22. -N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 221-227.
23. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law §§ 30-43. (incorporated into the Domestic Relations Law
by '.Y. Sess. Laws 1958, ch. 146).
24. 'N.Y. Family Ct. Act. art. IV, Part 6, §§ 461-466.
25. See NT.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 51 and N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 463. As to any terms
of the separation agreement beyond the question of support, the court has no jurisdiction
to enforce it as a contract.
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upon a showing of changes in circumstances. 26 Further, the supreme court may
refer questions of temporary support of both children and wife and custody in
marital actions to the Family Court for recommendation upon investigation
of the means of the parties.
27
B. Family Offenses
Although the Constitution permitted the Legislature to grant jurisdiction
in "crimes and offenses by or against minors or between spouses or between
parent and child or between members of the same household,
2 8 in criminal
procedures, the Legislative Committee, after examining the problems and
purposes of the parties in such matters, considered them specifically within
the province of the Family Court. They are to be treated as civil proceedings
with the aims of help and" rehabilitation rather than punishment.
29 Thus, it
established "exclusive original jurisdiction over any proceeding concerning
acts which would constitute disorderly conduct or an assault between spouses
or between parent and child or between members of the same family or house-
hold." 30
Any criminal complaint involving disorderly conduct or assault between
such persons must be transferred by the originating criminal court to the
Family Court, unless it is withdrawn within three days.
31 Since there was
26. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 461, 465, 466, 468.
27. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 461(c) (child), 464 (wife), 467.
28. N.Y. Const. art VI, § 13(b).
29. Certain other areas which were formerly in the predecessor courts as criminal
jurisdiction now do not come within the civil jurisdiction, such as violations of the Educa-
tion Law by parents, of the Labor Law by employers, contributing to the delinquency of
minors. As to the legislative purposes involving spouses, see N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 811.
The Committee described, for example, the intentions of a wife bringing assault charges
against the husband as: to secure protection, support and custody when the marriage
cannot be salvaged, to solve marital difficulties by counseling, or to stop heavy drinking
and assaults upon her while keeping the marriage going for what it is worth.
30. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 812. As originally presented, the draft did not include the
term "which would constitute"; its inclusion would indicate the change of opinion of the
Legislature in retaining both criminal and civil jurisdiction in these problems in two sets
of courts. Legislative comment indicated that the common-law, case by case adjudication
would have to define "family," "household," and "disorderly conduct." See therefore two
cases decided by the District Court of Nassau County: People v. Dugar, 235 N.Y.S.2d 152
(Dist. Ct. 1962), which ruled that a man and woman living in a meretricious relationship
were yet members of the same household and transferred the case to the Family Court, and
People v. Keller, 234 N.Y.S.2d 469 (Dist. Ct. 1962), in which mother-in-law and son-in-law
were ruled members of the same family and the case transferred.
31. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 813. There was no provision for the three-day waiting
period in the original draft, but it was determined that most of these cases are withdrawn
overnight, or after a few days on a change of mind or circumstances. In People v. Kaff,
35 Misc. 2d 859, 231 N.Y.S.2d 875 (Dist. Ct. 1962) the judge refused to transfer a family
assault matter from his court to the Family Court, agreeing that most misdemeanor com-
plants were withdrawn in a day or so, and thus were susceptible of the conciliation
procedures of the Family Court. However, the charge before the court was felonious
assault, an infamous crime, which required indictment by a Grand Jury, with provision
for preliminary arraignment and protections thereunder. Since the Family Court Act
contains no safeguards on temporary detention proceedings, it was not designed to include
felonies. To hold otherwise would be unconstitutional, the court decided. Unfortunately,
while no further material has been published in the case, by information and belief it
would seem that the judge actually did send it to the Family Court, and that it was
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considerable disagreement in procedure and disapproval of the whole concept,
the Judicial Conference in preparing the Rules of the Family Court included
authorization for the criminal court to hold the defendant, admit him to, fix,
or accept bail, or parole him for hearing before the Family Court, provided
the case is to be transferred there if not withdrawn in the three days or if
the case were not transferred to the criminal court.32 A case originating in the
Family Court or transferred to it as required may, in the discretion of the
Judge if the Family Court procedures seem to be inappropriate, be transferred
to the criminal court to be heard in the usual manner. 33 On the transfer to
the court of criminal jurisdiction, therefore, the regular provisions of the Penal
Law and the Code of Criminal Procedure will prevail, it is important to
determine on the filing of the complaint the circumstances and the crime
which might be charged.
Where a criminal complaint, even of a serious nature, is brought to the
local criminal court, it must be transferred unless the complainant withdraws
it in three days; a serious case could be sent in at once if the local judge
believes it will be returned to him and he wishes to initiate the proper criminal
procedures as soon as possible. The Family Court may then retain it or return
it at once. The local court must accept initial jurisdiction of any case if it
would be within its scope except for the relationship of the parties. By taking
the information and issuing the warrant, it has established the proper pro-
cedures and can continue the matter upon its return without difficulty. A more
serious problem arises where the petition is made in Family Court under the non-
criminal allegations specified in the statute, and the judge later determines
that it should be transferred to the criminal court. He is designated a magistrate
with all of the powers of that office, specifically by the Family Court Act, 4
and in that function can accept an information, arraign the defendant,35 issue
a warrant, and transfer the proceeding, now completely criminal in nature,
to the appropriate court. Procedures in these matters vary throughout the state,
in spite of the basic law and rules, so that more consistent acknowledgment
of certain constitutional rights of the parties should be had to avoid any
retained there, the husband and wife agreeing to look to the counseling services of the
court for help.
32. N.Y. Family Ct. R. 8.4. It would seem more appropriate for the Legislature to take
coznizance of this problem in both the Family Court Law and the Code of Criminal
Procedure, rather than to attempt control of procedures in one set of courts by the rules
of a completely independent court. Local judges are hesitant to hold defendants in jail on
the assumption that they have committed no crime. Transfer of bail moneys also creates
certain problems, particularly if the case is removed and then returned.
33. -N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 814. Note, however, N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 19(h) which
states: "As may be provided by law, the county court, the surrogate's court, the family
court and the courts for the city of New York established pursuant to Section 15 of this
article may transfer any action or proceeding, other than one which has previously been
transferred to it, to any other court, except the supreme court, having jurisdiction of the
subject matter in an.y other judicial district or county provided that such other court has
jurisdiction over the classes of persons named as parties." (Emphasis added.)
34. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 151.
35. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. §§ 145, 146.
492
FAMILY COURT JURISDICTION
question that they have been violated in the translation of a single matter
from the status of criminal to civil and back to criminal. On the opposite
pole, the law enforcement officers are hesitant about arresting persons for
assault or disorderly conduct who might be members of the same family or
same household, on the theory that under the Family Court Act, these people
are not committing any criminal act since the Family Court has exclusive
original jurisdiction which is civil in nature.36
In the Family Court, procedures are instituted by the filing of a petition
alleging the acts constituting the offense and praying for an order of protection
or conciliation, or in the alternative, for transfer to the appropriate criminal
court, which may be made by the aggrieved person, any other member of
the household, a duly authorized agency, a peace officer, or on the court's own
motion. 37 The probation service and intake department attempt to settle the
problem by adjustment but may never prevent the petitioner from having
access to the court; none of the statements made during this conciliation are
admissible in either the Family- Court adjudicatory hearing, or a criminal court
prior to conviction.3 8 Such petition is to be served on the respondent together
with a summons by civil process; a warrant may be issued on specified
grounds in the discretion of the court. As in other areas of jurisdiction, the
statute requires that there be an adjudicatory hearing first to determine
whether the allegations of the complaint have been sustained; if they have,
then the court may proceed to a dispositional hearing,3 9 where the petition
may be dismissed, judgment suspended, respondent placed on probation, or
order of protection made.40 If at any time the respondent fails to obey such
order, the court may, after a hearing, commit him to jail for a term not to
exceed six months; once made and complied with, the order of the court is
a bar to criminal prosecution on the same acts.
C. Conciliation
Many of the references in the Family Court Act are to conciliation pro-
ceedings, an area of law with which the constitution specifically charged the
Family Court and which has not been adequately implemented in the past
or by the current law.4 1 Some attorneys are writing agreements of reconcilia-
36. While it is not the function of a peace officer to inquire into the relationships of
the parties and to determine in advance the attitude of the courts in the problem, he is
fearful of the possibility of a suit for false arrest if the matter remains in the Family
Court.
37. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 821, 822.
38. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 823, 824.
39. N.Y. Family Ct. Act H9 831-836. Only competent, material and relevant evidence
may be heard in the adjudicatory heaiing; only material and relevant admitted in the
dispositional.
40. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 841, 842. The order of protection is an effective device
and meets the specific desires of most petitioners who are looking for some way of en-
forcing a peaceful home life.
41. Previously the Appellate Division was authorized to work out conciliation pro-
cedures, but nothing was completed. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1165-b, added by ch. 423 of
the Laws of 1959.
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tion instead of separation as an effort to reunite a family.42 Consideration is
a problem, since the agreement to do those acts which the law expects of a
husband or wife is not sufficient although the waiver of rights created by the
actions of the parties might be enough.43 Article 9 of the Act establishes the
beginnings of a conciliation court, but it is incomplete in comparison with
other states and does not meet the challenge which could occur in the use
of its facilities by the supreme court as a condition to continuing any
matrimonial action.44 The Family Court has no jurisdiction over any marital
action, per se; divorce, annulment, separation and the enforcement of a separa-
tion agreement must still be heard in the supreme court.
Either spouse may institute proceedings in conciliation by filing a petition
stating that the marriage is in difficulty and asking for conciliation.4' There-
upon, the probation service is authorized to confer with the petitioner and
to invite the spouse to attend such conferences as may be advisable in conciliat-
ing the couple. At the same time, the probation service may advise the parties
to consult with community social or religious agencies.46 Since the respondent
spouse will rarely submit to such counseling voluntarily, the petitioner may
apply for an order directing the spouse to appear in court for a hearing on
the merits of such application. If the court determines that it would serve the
purposes of the article to require attendance at such conference, it will so
order, then determine whether the proceeding should continue, be referred
to voluntary agencies or be terminated. 47 At any rate, unless the parties wish
to continue, the proceedings will terminate within ninety days.48
D. Paternity Proceedings
One of the important changes in the Family Court Act has been not in
placing and securing jurisdiction of filiation proceedings in the court, but in
clarifying and standardizing procedures already existent, heard, however,
prior to amendment, in two completely different courts and under divergent
theories of law. Article VIII of the Domestic Relations Law prescribed the
procedure for instituting such matters everywhere in the State except the City
of New York, while Article V of the New York City Criminal Courts Act
42. The effort of preparing such agreements and in discovering the areas of difficulty
and establishing courses of action may well serve as a form of conciliation. Each party
is well aware of what the other has to complain about and should agree on its recitations.
43. Thus, a wife may have cause for divorce, which she will lose if she forgives the
husband and cohabits with him under such agreement.
44. See N.Y. Family Ct. Act, art. IV, Part 6, §§ 461-469 as to the effect of such
marital actions on Family Court proceedings. Actions to secure a judgment for arrears in
support under such actions or agreement should be brought in Supreme Court; arrearage
is mentioned in the Family Court Act, but in reference to support orders of the court, and
to permit the cancellation of such arrears, where the purpose is to secure current support.
See N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 458.
45. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 921.
46. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 922, 923.
47. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 924, 925.
48. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 926.
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controlled cases there. In the upstate area, exclusive jurisdiction was given
to the Children's Courts. 49 These two sets of actions were quite similar. Yet
they had to be interpreted separately because they were criminal in nature in
New York City, or quasi-criminal, and governed in part by the Code of
Criminal Procedure. In the rest of the State they were completely civil in
nature and governed, insofar as courts not of record could be affected, by
the Civil Practice Act. These two articles have been repealed and are both
derivative of the paternity proceedings provided for in the Family Court Act.50
To search for precedents in two divergent sources will create new problems in
interpretation and enable the courts to reexamine certain concepts. 51
The Family Court has original jurisdiction to establish paternity and to
order support and determine custody on a finding of paternity, while the
Children's Court heard proceedings to compel support and education, and
the New York City Criminal Court had the jurisdiction to order support and
to provide for custody insofar as it related to the immiediate care of the
children.52 The statute is not addressed to the establishing of paternity for
purposes of inheritance, except as a judgment is a charge against an estate5 3
or creates a father-child relationship. 54 It would do nothing more than ad-
judicate an obligation of support in the putative father who need never ac-
knowledge such paternity then or at any time in the future.55 The support
is for the benefit of the child, and payment by the father would be made to
the benefit and use of whomever had custody.
The term "child born out *of wedlock" is defined in the Family Court
Act as one "who is begotten and born out of lawful matrimony" 56 and omits
the reference in the older statute to those situations where the husband of the
mother has been separated from her for a whole year, or under a separation
49. Former N.Y. Children's Ct. Act § 6.
50. N.Y. Family Ct. Act, art. V.
51. Schatkin, Disputed Paternity Proceedings (3d ed. 1953), the most definitive text
on paternity proceedings in New York State, was written by a member of the Corporation
Counsel's Office charged with bringing these cases in New York City, and it should be
used with care as the procedure in the new law is actually closer to the Children's Court
than the New York City system.
52. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 511; see former N.Y. Children's Act § 6, former N.Y.C.
Crim. Cts. Act § 60, and former N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 122.
53. Both parents are liable for necessary support and education and the child's funeral
expenses. If a parent dies, his or her estate can be required by the Surrogate's Court to
pay a claim based on an order of support or judicially approved settlement, having regard
to the age of the child, the ability of the surviving parent to support and educate, the
age and financial condition of other persons legally entitled to support so as to be the
natural objects of the decedent's bounty. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 513.
54. In a meretricious familial relationship, the father and child may be very close,
and the action might not be brought except at the behest of the welfare authorities to
establish his obligation by law; conceivably the Family Court might, under its power to
determine custody, award it to the father. Otherwise, children may be placed with such
other facilities as their need requires and the circumstances of the home demand.
55. There is no provision for a man to institute proceedings to'deny paternity. There
would be no necessity to do this unless the husband denies his wife's child and fails to
support it; he would have to bring such allegations in Supreme Court in divorce. The
non-husband has no cause of action, unless in tort for libel or slander.
56. See N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 512.
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judgment, or where the husband is impotent.57 Denial of paternity by a husband
of his wife's child must now be alleged and established by rules of evidence
and is no longer governed by legal presumptions. The father is obligated as
well, by statute, to pay the reasonable expenses of confinement and recovery
of the mother and of her pregnancy,58 which continues the former law,
and what determines their nature will be dependent upon a full showing to
the court of the facts and the respective circumstances of each party.
If the parents can reach an agreement on support, it must be submitted
for approval to the Family Court, after notice to the public welfare official
in the area.39 This permits the Court to protect the mother against an im-
pecunious settlement and affords the father freedom from filiation proceedings
as long as he conforms to the terms of the agreement. Such an arrangement
entered into by the parties without the approval of the court will not stand
as a bar to an action of the mother or the welfare authorities. The action must
be brought within the time limitations established by the statute, two years
after the birth of the child unless the father has acknowledged paternity in
writing or by furnishing support.60 As first written, the draft of the Family
Court Act specifically gave no greater privilege to a public welfare official,
but it was amended later to extend it to ten years from the birth of the
child.6 1 The petition may be instituted by the mother, by the child's guardian
or next of kin, by a representative of any charitable corporation, or by the
public welfare official.02 While the mother is essential to the proceedings as
petitioner or as complaining witness, the matter will not abate on her death
or insanity or her absence from the state.63
Venue of the proceedings to establish paternity is within the county
where the mother or child resides or is found or in the county where the
putative father resides or is found.0 4 This follows the former statute. How-
ever, a provision of the Domestic Relations Law that it is no bar to the
jurisdiction of the Court that the complaining mother or child resides in
"another county or state" if the defendant be a resident of this state 5 has
not been carried over into the new law and was never a part of the New
57. See former N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 119, and former N.Y.C. Crim. Cts. Act § 61.
58. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 514. If the child dies or she has released it for adoption,
there would be no claim for support, but her own costs and expenses could be recovered.
59. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 516.
60. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 517(a). Proof of this acknowledgement is difficult to ob-
tain usually-captions on snapshots, birthday cards, letters, memoranda, gifts at Christ-
mas, rare donation of food, small amounts of money paid to the mother without identifica-
tion of purpose.
61. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 517(b). Under the former law the public weltare official
could bring suit to age sixteen. The largest number of cases are instituted by the welfare
authorities and they may not be involved until the child is past the two-year limitation, so
the Committee reversed its stand and reinstituted, though shortened by six years, their right
to bring them.
62. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 522.
63. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 518.
64. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 521.
65. See former N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 135.
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York City law. A series of cases have held, on the New York City statute
and specifically distinguishing this section as well, that a mother and child
resident in a foreign country have no status in the proceedings even if the
putative father is a resident of New York state.66 A verified petition, instead
of a complaint, institutes the action; a summons is served personally or by
substituted means; if the respondent ignores it or has not been served or is
likely to leave the jurisdiction, the court may issue a warrant.67 Taken into
custody on a warrant, the respondent must be taken at once to a Family
Court judge who may require an undertaking or in default thereof, continue
him in custody.68 While giving the court discretion in establishing surety
procedures, this is a change from the former law which permitted the trial
to continue in the absence of the "defendant" if there were an undertaking
from which support could be had.69
Where pretrial procedures could not be used in the former courts, now
as a court of record the Family Court may entertain procedures for examination
before trial as set forth in the Civil Practice Act and after September 1, 1963
in the Civil Practice Law and Rules. At the hearing, held without a jury, both
parties may testify, though the respondent cannot be compelled to take the
stand. Proper corroboration by other facts and circumstances must be offered
with testimony of access by others, or it will be excluded; both husband and
wife may testify to non-access if the mother is married.70 The respondent may
move to have the court order blood tests of the mother, child and himself, and
the results may be received only where definite exclusion is established. The
statute grants a new discretion in the court to order a public health officer to
66. The Court of Appeals in Feyler v. Mortimer, 299 N.Y. 309, 87 N.E.2d 273 (1949)
held that such section 135 is taken from the Uniform Illegitimacy Act and is concerned
with filiation and support of parties resident in this state and other states of the United
States, who might be charges on the public; charges on any other country would not
concern them. Since this sentence did not appear in the New York City Law, there was
no reason to extend jurisidiction to mother and child resident in Germany. This case was
distinguished in Duerr v. Wittmann, 5 A.D.2d 326, 171 N.Y.S.2d 444 (1st Dep't. 1958),
where the German mother left her child at home and came to New York City to bring
suit. The Court held that regardless of citizenship it was sufficient if either the mother or
child were resident in the United States.
67. N.Y. Family CL Act §§ 523-526. Formerly a warrant was mandatory not dis-
cretionary.
68. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 527, 528. The undertaking is set forth in art. IV, Part
7, §§ 471-479 of the Act.
69. Former N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 126. There was a serious question on the right of
the Court to continue the trial to judgment if the defendant were not present and there
were no undertaking. Since the original bastardy laws of 1901 were criminal in nature,
then changed in New York City to quasi-criminal and in upstate New York to dcii, the
continuing practice had been that trial could not be held in the absence of the defendant
without an undertaking. The Court of Special Sessions in New York City, in "Brown" v.
"White" 215 N.Y.S.2d 584 (Spec. Sess. 1961), specifically disagreed, holding that once the
warrant was served and the defendant appeared to enter his denial, the court had jurisdic-
tion of the matter and could order support in personam on a finding of paternity; it was
not limited to a judgment against posted property. Provisions of tha C.PA. and C.P.L.R.
would now govern on default proceedings in the absence of the respondent.
70. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 531. Note that the title used the word "hearing" but the
body of the section refers to trial, and fails also to change the word "complaint" to
"petition."
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conduct such blood tests or to order payment from court funds or from public
welfare funds, if the respondent is financially unable to pay for the costs of
such tests.71 The theory of this section is that the court will need the informa-
tion in rendering a sound decision. On this basis there will be many applica-
tions for aid in having the tests and thus, a serious problem in establishing
consistent precedents.
While the court always had the right to dismiss a petition on a finding
that the respondent was not the father, the statute now sets this out specifi-
cally. 72 If it finds the respondent to be the father of the child, it shall make
an order of filiation, declaring paternity.73 Notification of the order of filiation
is required to be sent to the state commissioner of health, as well as notice
of abrogation or reversal on appeal. The support order provides that the
father, who is possessed of sufficient means or able to earn such means, pay
a fixed sum for the support and education of the child until it is twenty-one
or even afterwards, and also sets forth other obligations including prior
support and the mother's expenses.7 4 Enforcement of the order of the court
is also provided by reference to other sections of the Family Court Act. 7 "
E. Appeal
The right of appeal and procedures therefor are provided in article X
of the Family Court Act: appeals are taken directly to the Appellate Division
in the appropriate department, not to any intermediate term or court. Appeal
is of right, if it is one of disposition; otherwise it is discretionary to the
higher court. 6 Although appeals must be taken within thirty days after
entry, notice of the filing does not stay the order. The Appellate Division
may stay execution upon conditions established, and if the order is one of
support, an undertaking may be required. 7 No printed case or brief is
required. and when the appeal is taken on behalf of a child by a law guardian.
costs and disbursements are charged to the county as they are when a re-
spondent is awarded costs on appeals brought by a welfare officer.78 Provisions
of the Civil Practice Act and Rules of Civil Practice of course apply to the
appeals.'
71. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 532.
.2 N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 541.
N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 542. The limiting words of this section enable the court
to make a finding of paternity in the instant case though he may not at that point award
support: this is done by a separate order.
,4. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 545. This is similar to the support sections of the law, and
thus varies from the ori-inal laws. The former law and the first draft provided that sup-
port ceases at Sixteen years of age, but the final law enlarges this substantially.
5. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 548; see also N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 561-63. Other sec-
tions of the total law set forth in detail each proceeding, and do not incorporate by refer-
ence any other section. This is different in the paternity parts.
76. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 1011, 1012. See Maliades v. Maliades, 17 A.D.2d 994, 234
N.Y.S.2d. 274 (2d Dept. 1962) on right of appeal from Family Court.
77. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 1013, 1014.
78. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 1016, 1017.
79. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 1018. Thus the new Civil Practice Law and Rules will
affect this court in total and its proceedings in detail.
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The case load of the Family Court under this law will eventually be at
least four or five times as heavy as the predecessor Children's and Domestic
Relations Courts, and the court will have an increasingly important status
in the spectrum of the statewide judicial system. Where attorneys had little
experience in the former courts, counsel will appear in the new court in a
greater number and proportion of the cases, so that the bar must take a
specific and active part in the development of the functions of this court in
the best traditions of our law.
APPENDIX
The 1963 New York State Legislature has enacted certain amendments to the Family
Court Act which affect the text of the foregoing article, but which do not establish any
basic or serious changes. Some necessary ones have not yet been provided.
Many of the new laws have reference to the juvenile jurisdiction and provide some
relief to the problem of implementation of the requirements of the law found by the
court in the short months of its operation. Chapter 691 adds "any public welfare official
of this state" to section 119, and chapter 477, "a commissioner of public welfare" to
sections 756 and 758, as facilities to whom placement may be made under article VII.
Further care of the runaway child is provided in chapter 809 which amends section 718
to authorize a peace officer to take a runaway to a designated facility, rather than to
the parents, and to make certain assumptions about the child. Further, the officer is given
authority to question the child for a reasonable period of time by amendments to
section 724. Chapter 811 adds "female under the age of eighteen" to section 718.
The Legislature enacted an amendment (but only for a year, to March 31, 1964,
by chapters 809 and 810 and to July 1, 1964, by chapter 811) to section 756, to interpret
state training schools as duly authorized agencies for the placement of juvenile delinquents
and- persons in need of supervision. Chapter 698 amended the Social Welfare Law,
section 430, to enable the state training schools to accept juvenile delinquents under the
age of twelve where formerly they were accepted only if they had committed what would
be a felony if done by an adult. A new section 780 was added by chapter 809 to provide
for the powers of the court upon failure to comply with the order of protection under
section 779, and added to section 778 the right to make any order authorized under
sections 756 or 758 (a). Youth opportunity and rehabilitation centers were redesignated
youth centers, and procedures for referrals thereto, including the order of the Family
Court and of other agencies defined therein, are set forth in chapter 831. The court is
authorized on its own motion to transfer cases to another county by amendment to
section 717, in chapter 409, and section 763 is amended to provide for court action on the
notice of motion.
Procedural changes were added by the 1963 amendments as well, including the general
change of the name of "adjudicatory" hearings to "fact-finding" hearings by chapter
529; no explanation is given as to the purpose of this purely semantic change, and some
confusion may result. Chapter 490 provided for a new section 217 to require that the
original of any Family Court order under article 11, part 6 or article VI, part 3 shall
be filed with the County Clerk of that County and the duplicate original with the
Family Court Clerk; as originally presented to the Legislature, these were the opposite,
but the second printing of the bill reversed them to the final form. Greater use of community
agencies and auxiliary services of the court was proviled for by chapter 979, amending
sections 254, 255, 354 and 922-25.
Subpoenas duces tecum are provided for by amendment to section 153, under chapter
809, and specific reference is there made, by amending section 165, to the application, as
of their dates of effectiveness, of the CPLR, to any procedures not established in the
Family Court Act. Chapter 809 also amends section 155 to provide for certificate of war-
rant as well as the warrant to be used. Sections 243 and 245 are amended to enable the
Appellate Division to enter into an agreement with a qualified attorney to serve as law
guardian and to provide for reimbursement therefor. Section 456 is amended by chapter 809
to permit the court to place a person on probation if he violates the order of the court,
and other minor changes are made to sections 438, 457, 464 and 467 to correct terminology.
By chapter 810, the Family Court is specifically added to Courts of Record for Com-
mitment under section 20 of the Mental Hygiene Law. Compensation of judges and
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state aid are amended to conform to specific county problems by chapter 717, and higher
salaries are permitted retroactively for certain counties.
Two measures, passed by the Legislature, were vetoed by the Governor with memo-
randa. A bill to permit the appointment of an attorney as Family Court public representative
(Assembly Intro. 3692, Assembly Print 3793) was disapproved because it duplicated the
responsibilities vested by the Law in the law guardians, and in county attorneys and
corporation counsel.
General changes in the Family Offense Article were passed under Assembly Intro.
5019. Assembly Print 5651. Section 812 was amended to define "disorderly conduct,"
Transfers to the Family Court from the criminal court in which the complaint was made
were left to the discretion of the district attorney or the grand jury by amendments to
section S13, which would not then have permitted the Family Court to transfer the
matter back. This would have corrected the area of uncertainty as to the constitutionality
of the second transfer. The powers of the criminal court in holding the defendant, admit-
ting him to bail or paroling him were established by a new section 814, rather than relying
on the Rules 6f the Court. A new section 815 was added as well. It defines the powers
of the Family Court over the defendant-respondent transferred from the criminal court,
and limits the times for holding him prior to a hearing. Temporary orders of protection
were provided by a new section S28, and filing certificates by new section 847.
The Governor's Memorandum stated in part, that "[a]part from other defects in the
bill, there has been no sufcient showing of the necessity or desirability of reposing in a
District Attorney the determination that such offenses should be given criminal treatment
and that they should not be handled, in the first instance, by the Family Court. If such
treatment seems warranted, the Family Court is vested presently with ample power to
transfer such proceedings to a criminal court."
.An amendment to section 115 giving permanent concurrent jurisdiction over adoption
to the surrogate's court was approved by Assembly Introduction 3453. This would seem to
be in direct contravention of the constitutional provisions on the jurisdiction of the Family
Court, but it was vetoed by the Governor, one of the last measures on which he took action.
